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IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
JAMES N. THOMAS, and KATH-
LEEN McMUR TREY THOMAS, 
Appellants, 
vs. 
THE CHILDREN'S A ID S 0 -
CIETY, of Ogden, a Corporation, 
Respondent. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT 
Case No. 
9419 
This is a Habeas Corpus proceeding commenced 
in the District Court of Weber County to regain cus-
tody of the infant child of Appellants. The pertinent 
facts are set forth in the pleadings R. 54, 64, 136 and 
the testimony, R. 182, 183 and 226. The testimony 
is voluminous, accumulative, and, in many instances 
irrelevant and immaterial, yet we respectfully suggest 
that if this Court will read the entire record, it will 
appear that the only real issue in this case is the Race 
question. The conclusion is inescapable that if the 
Appellants in this case had been both of the same race, 
2 
this case would never have reached the courts. 
The trial was continued several times at the re. 
quest of Respondent for the purpose of securing wit· 
nesses on its behalf, which motions were granted b" 
I 
the Court over the objections of Appellants (R. 90 
' 
91, 98, 101, 116). 
Respondent took the depositions of Calvin and 
Mary McMurtrey (R. 180), but the McMurtreys ap. 
peared in person at the trial (R. 226, page 3 ), and 
for this reason their depositions were not published 
or offered in evidence. Notwithstanding this fact, the 
seal on this deposition has been broken and opened 
without authority of Law and in violation of Rule 
30 (b). 
The nature of this case makes one wonder how 
such flagrant irregularity can happen in a court of 
Justice. 
After trial, Judgment was entered awarding cus· 
tody of the child to the Respondent (R. 168). 
The Appellants filed their motion for a new • 
trial (R. 15 3), which motion was denied (R. 171). 
from which the Appellants prosecute this Appeal and 
assign the following: 
3 
ERRORS 
1. Error of the Court in continuing the trial 
from September 14, 1960 to December 7, 1960, with-
out a showing of due diligence as provided by Law. 
2. Error of the Court in not finding on all the 
issues as presented by the pleadings and the evidence. 
3. Error of the Court in holding that the child 
is illegitimate. 
4. Error of the Court in holding that the mar-
riage of the Appellants is void under Section 30-1-2 
( 5 ) , U tab Code 19 5 3 . 
5. Error of the Court in finding that the re-
lease executed by the mother was not obtained by 
duress, undue influence or coercion. 
6. Error of the Court in denying Appellants' 
Motion for a New Trial. 
7. The Judgment is contrary to the evidence. 
8. The Judgment is contrary to Law. 
To sustain this Appeal the Appellants rely on 
the following: 
POINT I 
THE COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION 
IN GRANTING DEFENDANT A CONTIN-
UANCE FROM SEPTEMBER 14, 1960. 
4 
POINT II 
THE FATHER OF AN ILLEGITIMATE 
CHILD IS ENTITLED TO ITS CUSTODY. 
POINT III 
SECTION 78-30-4, UTAH CODE 1953, IS 
UNCONSTITUTIONAL AND VOID AS 
APPLIED TO APPELLANT, JAMES N. 
THOMAS. 
POINT IV 
FAILURE OF THE TRIAL COURT TO 
FIND ON ALL ISSUES OF FACT PRE-
SENTED BY THE PLEADINGS AND EVI-
DENCE IS REVERSIBLE ERROR. 
POINT V 
THE CHILD, IN THIS CASE, IS A LEGITI-
MATE CHILD. 
POINT VI 
THE MERE SIGNING OF AN INSTRU-
MENT AND HANDING IT TO AN OFFI-
CER AUTHORIZED TO TAKE AC-
KNOWLEDGMENTS DOES NOT CONSTI-
TUTE AN ACKNOWLEDGMENT AS RE· 
QUIRED BYLAW. 
5 
POINT VII 
SECTION 30-1-2(5) UTAH CODE 1953 
IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL AND VOID. 
ARGUMENT 
We contended at the trial that the mother was 
coerced into giving her child away. We do not waive 
that issue, but to brief it here would unduly prolong 
this brief. 
See, Trigg vs. Trigg, 22 P. 2nd 119, Gardenas 
vs Ortiz, 226 P. 418. 
POINT I 
THE COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION 
IN GRANTING DEFENDANT A CONTIN-
UANCE FROM SEPTEMBER 14, 1960. 
R. 91, 98, 116, 
Rule 40 (b) Utah Code, 
Neven vs. Neven, 154 P. 78, 
State vs. Ma this, 319 P. 2nd 134. 
This case was originally set for trial for August 
17, 1960 at 11:00 o'clock A. M. (R. 89). 
On August 17, the Appellants appeared in per-
son and with their counsel ready for trial, at which 
time the Respondent through its counsel, requested a 
continuance to August 31, 1960 (R. 91), but this 
continuance had. already been granted the day before 
(R. 90). 
6 
On August 24, the Respondent appeared in 
Court ex parte and obtained a continuance from Au_ 
ust 31 to September 14 (R. 101). g 
On August 24, the Appellants appeared in Courr 
and moved the Court for an Order denying Respon-
dent's request for a continuance (R. 107). 
On September 14, the Court made and entered 
its Order vacating the trial date of September 14 (R. 
116). 
This Order states that it was vacated upon the 
request and stipulation of counsel, which is erroneous 
in that it was granted over the objections and protest 
of the Appellants (R. 110, 111). 
At R. 108, Paragraph 4, it was pointed out to 
the Court at that time that there was no assurance 
made to the Court that Spencer B. Wheatley would 
appear for trial on September 14, 1960. 
Rule 40 (b) of the Utah Code provides, amoni 
other things: 
"If the motion is made upon the ground~ 
of the absence of evidence, such motion shall 
also set forth the materiality of the evidence ex· 
pected to be obtained and SHALL SHOW 
DUE DILIGENCE HAS BEEN USED TO 
PROCURE IT." 
The Record shows that from the inception of tbi~ 
case the witness whose evidence was being sought was 
7 
known to the Respondent and that the Respondent 
also knew that said witness was a resident of the State 
of Idaho and could not be compelled to attend trial 
in the State of Utah, and for this reason it is the posi-
tion of Appellants that it was gross negligence on the 
part of the Respondent in not taking the deposition of 
said witness in due season. 
Rule 40 ( b) cited above, expressly provides that 
the Court may, in its discretion, grant a continuance 
provided due diligence is shown in trying to obtain 
such evidence. Under this Rule there is no discretion 
granted in the absence of a showing of due diligence. 
Neven vs. Neoen is a Nevada case wherein the 
Supreme Court of Nevada said: 
''A party who is a material witness in his 
own behalf must have his testimony ready for 
use at the trial unless prevented from doing so 
by some obstacle which by the exercise of rea-
sonable diligence he cannot overcome, and the 
obstacle should not be one which he has created 
by his own voluntary act. If he allows consid-
eration of business or pleasure or even regard 
his own health to call him away for a time 
when his suit is liable to be called for trial and 
thereby loses the benefit of his own testimony 
he must suffer the consequences. A party must 
be held to the exercise of good faith and dili-
gence and cannot be heard to complain if the 
failure to present his case results from an at-
tempt to subordinate the business of the Court 
~o his own business engagements and conven-
ience." 
8 
State vs. Mathis is a Utah case where the·· 
. . d' d nght 
to a contmuance 1s 1scusse and the authorities a na. 
lyzed and, even though the continuance there com. 
plained of was upheld, one concurring Justice ques-
tioned the validity of the decision and one Justice 
wrote a strong and forceful dissenting opinion and in 
this we respectfully submit to this Court that the 
authority of the trial court to grant a continuance 
should be resricted to those cases where there is a show. 
ing of diligence as provided by the statute. The pub. 
lication and reception of this deposition in evidenc~ 
was duly objected to at the trial R., 226, Page 92. 
POINT II 
THE FATHER OF AN ILLEGITIMATE 
CHILD IS ENTITLED TO ITS CUSTODY. 
55-10-32, U. C. 1953, 
55-10-6, u. c. 1953, 
55-10-19, u. c. 1953, 
77-4-10, u. c. 1953, 
77-60-12, u. c. 1953, 
10 c. J. s. 83, 
Utah Fuel Co. vs. Ind. Comm., 234 r 
697, 
Re a Minor, 155 F. 2nd 870, 
Gen. 1 :28. 
The Court found, and we assume, for the sakeol 
this point, that the child is illegitimate. 
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On the Sixth day of Creation, God made Man, 
in His own image, and directed him as follows: 
''Be fruitful, and multiply, and replenish 
the Earth ... " Gen. 1:28. 
At that time there was no law upon the subject 
of marriage and from that day forward, men have been 
begetting children by their wives, their concubines, 
their maid-servants, and the harlots in the streets, but, 
in all instances and on all occasions, the fathers have 
been required to, and did, support and provide for 
their offspring, with few exceptions under the Com-
mon Law. 
Today, m Utah, the father of an illegitimate 
child is required by statute to support such child. 
Section 5 5-10-19 provides, among other things: 
'' * * * the Court shall adjudge that 
he pay to the Court a sum of money not ex-
ceeding two-hundred dollars ($200) for the 
first year after the birth of such child and a 
sum not exceeding one-hundred-fifty dollars 
( $15 0) yearly for seven teen years succeeding 
said first year for the support and maintenance 
and education of such child." 
Section 5 5- 10-3 2 provides: 
"No child as defined in this Chapter shall 
be taken from the custody of its parents . 
without the consent of such parents." 
said: 
10 
Section 5 5-10-6 defines parent: 
'.' 'Parent', wh.en used in relation to a child 
shall mclude guardian and everv person wh • 
by Law liable to maintain a child." 
01
J 
and child: 
"The word 'child' means a person Jess 
than eighteen ( 18) years of age." 
Section 77-60-12 provides: 
"The father of such child shall not have 
the right to its custody or control, if the mother 
is living and wishes to retain such custody and 
control, until after it shall have arrived at the 1 
age of ten years unless upon petition of the Dis-
trict Court of the county in which the mother 1 
resides, it shall upon full hearing after notice 
to the mother, be made to appear that the 
mother is not a suitable person to have the cus· 
tody and control of said child." 
Under the title, "Bastards", 10 C. J. S. 83, it is 
"While it has been stated broadly that the 
putative father of a bastard or illegitimate child 
has no parental power or authority over such 
child, and that the father is not entitled to the 
custody and services of the child, in the ~bsence 
of statute or contract giving him the nght to 
custody and imposing on him the duty to sup· 
port and there are expressions to the effec.t thar 
the father is not entitled to the custody m the . 
absence of a correlative duty to support the 
1 
11 
child, it has been held or recognized that the 
putative father is in general entitled to custody 
against all but the mother." 
Section 7 7 -4-10 provides: 
"Every illegitimate child is an heir of the 
person who acknowledged himself to be the 
father of such child, and in all cases is an heir 
of his mother; and inherits his or her estate, in 
whole or in part, as the case may be, in the same 
manner as if he had been born in lawful wed-
lock. The issue of all marriages null in law, or 
dissolved by divorce, are legitimate." 
In the case of Utah Fuel Company vs. Industrial 
Commission, supra, this statute was construed as fol-
lows: 
"In view, therefore, that under our stat-
ute ... the marriage of applicant to the deceased 
was null and void under our statute ... the 
applicant could not be awarded compensation 
under the Industrial Act. Keeping in mind, 
however, all of the provisions of our statute, 
we are forced to the conclusion that it was the 
intention of the Legislature of this state to de-
clare all of those children that are the fruit of 
marriages that are void under our statute ... 
as legitimate and entitled to all the benefits of 
children born in lawful wedlock ... The law 
is humane and appeals to every man's sense of 
justice and fairness. Why should a child which 
is the fruit of a void marriage be punished for 
the wrongful act of its parents? If any punish-
ment is to be inflicted, let it fall upon those 
12 
who are the actors in the drama and not up 
the i~nocent and helpless. Moreover, societ/1~ ~e~e~1t~ed by every humane and. jus.t law, while 
1t is mJured by every law that mfhcts injustic
2 ~P?n eve~ the humblest me~ber of society lt 
is JU~t as important that. c~1ldren born of such 
marnages be protected as it is that other children 
are. The conclusion of the Commission award-
ing compensation to the beneficiary is therefore 
not vulnerable to the objection raised by plain-
tiff." 
U tab statutes express! y provide for the support 
of an illegitimate child by its reputed father and gives 
him the right to its custody against all the world ex-
cept the mother. There are certain provisions of the 
statute which authorizes the taking of children from 
the custody of both of the parents under certain con· 
ditions, none of which are involved in this case. 
A case in point under statutes similar to those 
cited above is In re Minor, supra, in which the Court 
of Appeals for the District of Columbia said: 
"We hold that it was error for the court to 
enter the decree of adoption when the interests 
of this father were not fully before the court for 
consideration, his name and location being 
known, and he having been afforded no oppor· 
tunity to present to the court an acknowledg· 
ment of the adoptee. If, being afforded t~at 
opportunity, he failed to acknowledge the ch1Jd, 
his consent is not necessary under the statute. 
If he does acknowledge it, his consent is ne~es· 
sary, in view of what we have to say concerning 
13 
his contribution in the support of the adoptee." 
At the trial in the Court below, and upon Appel-
lants· :fvlotion for a New Trial. counsel for Respon-
dent argued that the father of an illegitimate child has 
no rights to its custody and relied upon Section 78-
30-4, which authorizes the mother of an illegitimate 
child to give it away for adoption. 
POINT III 
SECTION 78-30-4, UTAH CODE 1953, IS 
UNCONSTITUTIONAL AND VOID AS 
APPLIED TO APPELLANT, JAMES N. 
THOMAS. 
190, 
Mills vs. Brown, 88 P. 609, 
Reyne vs. Trade Comm., 192 P. 2nd 563, 
Union Trust vs. Simmons, 211 P. 2nd 
Hurwitz vs. North, 264 S. W. 678, 
16 C. J. S. 566, and cases there cited, 
78-30-4. U. C. 1953. 
Section 78-30-4 provides, among other things: 
"A legitimate child cannot be adopted 
without the consent of its parents, if living, nor 
an illeaitimate child without the consent of its 
mothe~, if living, except that consent is not nec-
essary from a father or mother who has been 
judicially deprived of the custody of the child 
14 
on account of cruelty, neglect, or desertion." 
Under this provision of the statute counsel con. 
tended, and the Court held, that the consent of the 
father was not necessary, (R. 165, Paragraph 3 ). 
It is the position of Appellants that if such a 
construction can be placed upon this statute. then that 
statute is unconstitutional and void in that it author-
izes a private individual to deprive another individual 
of his natural, statutory, and constitutional rights 
without a hearing of any kind. 
In this case the father had not been deprived of 
the custody of his child on account of cruelty, neglect, 
or desertion, or otherwise determined to be an unfit 
father to have the custody of his child. 
Under the title, "Constitutional Law", 16 C. J 
S. cited above, it is said at page 566: 
"Inasmuch as the power to legislate is b~ 
nature non-delegatable, a fortiori, it may not be 
delegated to a private person or persons." 
This doctrine seems to be supported by the over· 
whelming weight of authority. 
The power of the Legislature to delegate its 
power was discussed at length, by this Court, in the 
case of Mill vs. Brown, supra, in which the custody 
of a child was directly involved. The question pre· 
15 
sented involved the power of the Legislature to pro-
vide for the commitment of a child to the Industrial 
School without givmg its parents an opportunity to 
be beard. 
In holding Section 7 of Chapter 117, Laws of 
Utah, 1905 unconstitutional and void, this Court 
said: 
"As we have already pointed out, the pro-
ceedings of the juvenile court do not fall, nor 
are they intended to come, within what is 
termed criminal procedure, nor are the acts 
therein mentioned, as applied to children, 
crimes. To constitute the acts under Section 7 
of an adult a crime, entitles such adult to the 
right of a trial as for any other crime. This 
right is denied by said Section 7 and it cannot, 
therefore, be upheld. Quite true, some method 
is necessary to punish adults when interfering 
with children who may be held to be wards of 
the state, and no doubt it is proper for the Leg-
islature to provide for their punishment. When 
such is done, however, trial must be provided 
for in the proper forum and legal manner. Sec-
tion 7 of the act, for the reason that it violates 
this elementary provision, so to speak, of crim-
inal law and procedure, must, therefore, be held 
of no force or effect." 
After analyzing further authorities, the Court 
continued: 
"But there is another reason for which we 
think the judgment cannot be permitted to 
16 
stand. By a careful examination of th 
a.hove cited, it will be found that all the cdases 
h . . e ec1-~io1:1s rest upon t e proposition that the state 
m its sovereigbn power. ha
1
sf the right, when nec-
essary, to su stit_ute itse as guardian of the 
person of the child for that of the parent 
01 
other legal guardian, and thus to educate a ' 
save the child from a criminal career· that :,no 
' .. ll 11 
the welfare of th~ c~ild tha~ moves the state t~ 
act, and. not. to ~nfh.ct punishment or to mete 
out retributive Justice for any offense com. 
mitted or threaten ed. In other words, to do that 
which it is the duty of the father or guardian 
to do, and which the law assumes he will do bv 
reason of the love and affection he holds for his 
offspring and out of regard for the child's fu. 
ture welfare. The duty thus rests upon the 
father first, so it must likewise logically follow 
that he must be given the first right to dis-
charge that duty." 
Reyne vs. Trade Commission, is a Utah case 
wherein this Court held a statute unconstitutional 
which granted power to the Executive Board of the 
Barbers' Union to compel all barbers to close their 
shops at a certain time and charge a certain fee io: 
their services, by saying, at page 568: 
"Sections 2, 3, and 4 of the act are uncon· 
stitutional as an improper delegation of author· 
ity." 
The right of a man to enjoy the comfort, plea· 
sure and companionship of his children is a fundamen-
tal and natural right which is protected by both state, 
and federal, constitutions. 
17 
In Hurwitz vs. North, supra, the Supreme Court 
of Missouri said: 
says: 
"Due process does not always mean a court 
hearing, but there must be a hearing after due 
notice, and an opportunity to defend the right 
involved before a legally constituted body for 
determining such a right of the citizen." 
In speaking of illegitimate children, Sec. 78-30-4 
"* * * except that consent from a 
father or mother who has been judicially de-
prived of the custody of the child on account 
of cruelty, neglect, or desertion, is not necessary 
* * * " 
In its first breath the legislature says that the con-
sent of the mother is necessary, if she is living, but is 
silent as to the father, which implies that his consent 
is not necessary. In its second breath it says that the 
consent of a father is not necessary if h'e has been ju-
dicially deprived of custody, etc. which implies that 
his consent is necessary. 
We have pointed out herein, wherein the Legisla-
ture may not directly delegate power to an individual 
to deprive another individual of his rights-query-
May the Legislature, by implication, delegate such 
power? These two provisions of the act, being incon-
sistent and irreconcilable with each other, the latter 
should prevail and ·the former held void. 
18 
The unconstitutionality of Section 78- 30-4 
called to the attention of the Court in App ll wa'. 
e ants 
Motion for a New Trial (R. 153) and the sam 
. · ' e Was 
denied by the Court (R. 171). 
POINT IV 
FAILURE OF THE TRIAL COURT TO 
FIND ON ALL ISSUES OF FACT PRE-
SENTED BY THE PLEADINGS AND EVI-
DENCE IS REVERSIBLE ERROR. 
30-1-3, 4, u. c. 1953, 
U. R. C. P. Rule 5 2, 
Gaddis Investment Co. vs. Morrison, 278 
P. 2nd 284, 
Cases there cited. 
Respondent alleged that Appellants' marriage is 
void by reason of a former marriage (R. 66, Para· 
graph 4). Appellants alleged that their marriage was 
entered into, in good faith, thinking that JAMES' 
first wife had divorced him (R. 68, Paragraph 4). 
Respondent alleged that the marriage was void because 
prohibited by Utah miscegenation statutes (R. 66, 
Paragraph 4). Appellants testified that their marriage 
took place in Idaho and that they returned to Utah 
only for the purpose of securing custody of their child 
and to pay a few debts (R. 182, page 74). On both 
of these issues there is no conflict in the evidence, but 
the Court made no finding on either issue. 
19 
In the Morrison case, this Court, following a 
Jong line of previous decisions, said: 
"It appears that the judgment was based 
principally upon the findings that the contract 
was entered into and the commission had not 
been paid, totally disregarding defendant's an-
swer to the complaint. It has been frequently 
held that the failure of the trial court to make 
findings of fact on all material issues is reversi-
ble error where it is prejudicial." 
Section 30-1-3 provides that when a marriage is 
contracted in good faith, thinking a former spouse has 
obtained a divorce, the children of such marriage are 
legitimate, thus it was a very material issue in this case, 
whether or not JAMES, in good faith, thought he was 
divorced. 
Section 30-1-4 provides that marnages con-
tracted in another country or state are valid here. This 
Court has held that marriages are not valid where the 
parties go elsewhere for the purpose of evading the 
laws of this state and return here to live. The plead-
ings and evidence show that the marriage in question 
was contracted in Idaho, thus it was a material issue 
as to whether or not Appellants returned to Utah to 
make it their home; the Court made no findings on 
either of these issues and thereby committed reversible 
error. 
20 
POINT V 
THE CHILD, IN THIS CASE, IS A LEGITI-
MATE CHILD. 
697, 
30-1-3, U. C. 1953, 
30-1-4, U. C. 1953, 
77-60-14, U. C. 1953, 
78-30-12, U. C. 1953, 
Harrison VS. Harker, 142 P. 716, 
Utah Fuel Co. vs. Ind. Comm., 234 P. 
Ex Parte Hart, 130 P. 704. 
Section 3 0-1- 3 provides: 
''When a marriage is contracted in good 
faith and in the belief of the parties that a for· 
mer husband or wife, then living and not leg· 
ally divorced, is dead or legally divorced, the 
issue of such marriage born or begotten before 
notice of the mistake shall be the legitimate is· 
sue of both parties.'' 
Section 30-1-4 provides: 
"Marriages solemnized in any other c?un· 
try, state or territory if valid where solemnized. 
are valid here.'' 
Section 77-60-14 provides: 
"If the mother of any such child and the 
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father shall at any time after its birth inter-
marry, the child shall and in all respects be 
deemed legitimate." 
Section 78-30-12 provides: 
. "The father of. an . illegiti-:1iate child, by 
publicly acknowledging 1t as his own, receiv-
ing it as such with the consent of his wife, if he 
is married, into his family, and otherwise treat-
ing it as if it were a legitimate child, thereby 
adopts it as such, and such child is thereupon 
deemed for all purposes legitimate from the time 
of its birth." 
Under Point II we pointed out the failure of the 
Court to make findings on the issues as to whether or 
not the marriage of Appellants was contracted in good 
faith and whether or not they returned to Utah to 
live. Those two issues were material issues in this case, 
under the above cited statutes. 
Harrison vs. Harker deals specifically with Sec-
tion 78-30-12, in which this Court said: 
"It is urged that the father ... has none. 
This on the ground that a father has no right 
to the custody of a child born out of wedlock . 
. . . But I am satisfied the marriage, and the 
father by his petition publicly acknowledging 
the child to be his, and seeking its custody as 
his own, legitimated it. What more public ac-
knowledgment could be made than was made 
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by t~e fathe~-an acknowledgment of 
bmdmg on him for all time?·· record 
In Fuel Co. vs. I~d. Comm., this Court held that 
eve~ though the marriage was void in law, the off. 
spnng of such marriage is legitimate and entitled 
inherit from its father, saying, at page 699: to 
. . "Keeping in mind, however, all of the pro. 
v1s1ons of our statute, we are forced to the con. 
clusion that it was the intention of the Legisla-
ture of this state to declare all of those children 
that are the fruit of marriages that are void 
under our statute (unless those mentioned in 
section 64 3 0 are an exception) as legitimate and 
entitled to all the benefits of children born in 
lawful wedlock." 
Ex Parte Hart is a California case wherein the 
father accused his wife of adultery and sought a di· 
vorce on that ground, he gave the child to the Child· 
ren' s Home Society for the purpose of adoption. Tht 
mother brought Habeas Corpus proceedings to recover 
custody of the child after it had been released for adop-
tion, and in allowing the writ, the Supreme Court of 
California said: 
"The mere relinquishment by the father 
without the mother joining therein, could have 
no effect, except where there had been a pnor 
adjudication with reference to her adultery. 
Here there had been no adjudication, and at the 
date of the execution of the instrument the 
mother possessed the right to be heard and to 
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resist any attempt to relinquish parental control 
of the child to the. C~ild~en's Home Society. 
The subsequent adjudication of her previous 
adultery would not have the effect to destroy 
that right. The child, then, was in the custody 
of the Children's Home Society by the suffer-
ance of the father alone, without the mother's 
consent; the respondents by assuming custody 
under authority of the Children's Home Soci-
ety, acquired no right as against the mother." 
In the instant case JAMES married Anna Lou on 
June 3, 19 56 and they separated on July 4, 19 56 and 
never lived together again and shortly thereafter, she 
started proceedings to divorce him (R. 182, pages 20 
to 24), and according to his undisputed testimony, 
JAMES thought she had divorced him. Under these 
circumstances it is the position of Appellants that the 
consent of the wife referred to in the statute is not 
applicable here. In other words, it was not the intent 
of the Legislature that a man should have the consent 
of an estranged ex-wife before he could adopt a child 
as his own. In this we respectfully submit that this 
child, under law, is the legitimate child of JAMES and 
cannot be adopted without his consent. 
POINT VI 
THE MERE SIGNING OF AN INSTRU-
MENT AND HANDING IT TO AN OFFI-
CER AUTHORIZED TO TAKE AC -
KNOWLEDGMENTS DOES NOT CONST!-
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TUTE AN ACKNOWLEDGMENT AS R 
QUIRED BY LAW. E. 
77-30-4, U. C. 1953, 
Spangler VS. Third District Court 140 p 2nd 755, ' · 
People vs. O' Riley, 86 N. Y. 154, 
State vs. Finn, 52 P. 756, 
Throwbridge vs. Bisson, 44 N. W 2 d 
810, · n 
Wilde vs. Buchanan, 303 S. W. 2nd 518, 
Pardo vs. Creamer, 310 S. W. 2nd 218, 
Bradley vs. U. S. 218 F. 2nd 657, 
In Re Beecher, 50 F. S. 2nd 530. 
The last part of Section 77-30-4 provides: 
'' * * * Whenever it shall appear that 
the parent or parents whose consent would 
otherwise be required have theretofore, in writ· ' 
ing, acknowledged before any officer author· : 
ized to take acknowledgments, released his or 
her, or their control or custody of such child to 
any agency licensed to receive children for place· 
ment or adoption under Chapter 3 of th1~ 
Title." 
The evidence shows the circumstances under 
which the mother signed the release, the substance of 
which is, after months, weeks, days, and hours of . 
persuasion, coercion, duress, and undue influence, she . 
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placed her signature on the instrument and Mr. 
Wheatley snatched it out of her hand, put it in his 
brief case and went away (R. 183, pages 3 7 to 69). 
Spangler vs. District Court, supra, is a Utah 
case wherein this Court said: 
said: 
"To constitute the taking of an oath, there 
must be definite evidence that affiant was not 
only conscious that he was taking an oath, but 
there must be some outward act from which 
that consciousness can definitely be inferred, 
which cannot be done from the mere signature 
to a printed form of oath." 
In State vs. Finn, the Supreme Court of Oregon 
·'Without a direct administration of the 
oath, there can be no affidavit, under the stat-
ute. And, while a non-observance of the exact 
formula in its administration may not release 
the affiant of legal responsibility under it, yet, 
it is plain that there must be some actual and 
bona fide attempt at a due observance of the 
law's requirements to give validity to the docu-
ment as an affidavit." 
''The defendant seeks to excuse or palliate 
his conduct, as it respects his certification of the 
alleged affidavit, by asserting that the manner 
in which he obtained the assent of the affiants 
thereto was the usual manner of administering 
oaths in such cases. If this is true, there is a 
signal vice in the practice; and as was said by 
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finch, Judge In Re Eldridge. 82 N. y 
16 ~t would only.make our duty the more i~ e/ 
t1ve that the vice may be eradicated.· " p d· 
We contend that it was the intention of the Le . 
islature, by requiring that the signature to be acknow~ 
edged before an officer authorized by law to take ac-
knowledgments. was to require and does require more 
solemnity than a mere informal admission that one 
owes a debt. If the Legislature had intended such in-
formal acknowledgment, it would not have required 
the same to be made before a person authorized by Jaw 
to take oaths. 
POINT VII 
SECTION 30-1-2(5) UTAH CODE 1953 
IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL AND VOID. 
U. S. Constitution Amendments L 5 and 
14, 
Utah Constitution, Article L Sections L 
4, 7. 24 and 27. 
Parez vs. Lippold, 198 P. 2d 17, 
Oyamma vs. O'Neill, Case No. 61269 
S. Ct. Pima Co., Arizona. 
The court held that the marriage of the appel· 
lants was unlawful, prohibited and void for violation 
of the provisions of Section 30-1-2 ( 5) U. C. A 
19 5 3 ( R. 16 5 ) . 
27 
We refer the court to Appellants' memorandums 
R 42 and 133 which are made a part hereof by ref-
erence. 
We pointed out there and repeat here that under 
the Equal Protection clauses of both Federal and State 
Constitutions a State is required to grant all citizens 
the equal protection of the law. Assuming, but not 
admitting. that the State Legislature may, for the best 
interest. \Velfare and protection of its citizens, prohibit 
inter-racial marriages-Query: May the Legislature 
in the face of the above cited constitutional prohibi-
tions, legislate to protect the purity of one race alone? 
If public welfare requires keeping the white race pure, 
why doesn't public welfare require keeping all other 
races pure? 
The Court will observe that the provlSlons of 
Section 3 0- 1-2 ( 5) and ( 6) only prohibits inter-mar-
riage between the races therein named with white per-
sons, but it does not prohibit inter-marriage between 
rhose other races with each other, and for this reason 
Jlone that statute is repugnant to the Equal Protec-
tion clauses of both Federal and State Constitutions. 
CONCLUSION 
In our opening statement we called the court's 
attention to the magnitude of the record in this case, 
most of which was irrelevant and immaterial, and cal-
culated to cloud, camouflage and confuse the real issue. 
28 
For instance, the respondent claimed th , 
1 . . at appe1 ants were msane, slCk, unfit persons to ha h · 
d f 
. . Ve t e CU!-
to y o their child and the best interest of th . , 
· d h · e ch1la 
require t at 1t be taken from them and 1 d . p ace for 
adoption, but the trial court would not be m· ·db ISie i 
such subterfuge (R. 226, pages 144, 145). 
Respondent a~so contended that the marriage JI 
appellants was v01d for two reasons: (1) becaul1 
James had a former wife from whom he was notdJ. 
vorced; and ( 2) because marriages between whit1 
and negroes are forbidden by statute. 
The first of these two contentions was who!!; 
irrelevant in that Utah statutes legitimates such chM 
ren and secondly the statute relied on is unconstltu· 
1 
tional and void, and in this the trial court was led into ' 
error. 
We have shown in this brief the status of a chila 
born under the circumstances revealed by the facts in 
this case, that is, that the parents of such child are err 
titled to its custody until deprived thereof by the pro 
cesses provided by law; that the father of such chil011 
entitled to its custody, subject only to the first ri~n: · 
of the mother, even if such child is determined to~ 
illegitimate. We have shown that under the circum 
stances of this case, the child is legitimate and ili11 
court has said that an innocent child should not~ 
bastardized because of the sins of its parents. 
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\Ve contended in the trial court, and we contend 
here. that the miscegenation statute is not applicable 
because the marriage did not take place in Utah, but 
the respondent msisted upon injecting that issue into 
this case and the court accepted the issue and held the 
statute to be constitutional, and valid. 
We have pointed out how the mother was co-
erced into giving the child away, and the invalidity of 
rhe statute under which she did so. 
Say what one may, the real and only germane 
issue presented by the record in this case is the race 
issue, and the application of the principles of Democ-
racy as defined by our founding fathers, in the resolu-
tions of that issue. The founding fathers said: 
"We hold these truths to be self evident-
that all men are created equal, that they are en-
dowed by their Creator with certain inalienable 
rights-that among these are, life, liberty and 
tbe pursuit of happiness." 
Our forefathers fought a bloody Civil war to pre-
serve those principles. This nation joined the confla-
gration of World War II to help conquer a "master 
race'' in Germany; and incidentally, the appellant, 
James, served in that war. Today the free peoples of 
the world are still watching and waiting to see if a 
nation so conceived, can endure. 
One sure way to preserve that nation is to prac-
tice the lesson taught on the Mount, where it was said: 
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''Not everyone that saith unto me L d 
Lord, shall enter the Kingdom of Heav~n °b '. 
he that doeth the will of my Father which,isut 
H ,, In eaven. 
And to this end we respectfully submit that, th, 
law should protect the appellants in their right to thi 
custody of their child the same as if they were both oi 
the same racial origin and in this we submit that the 
judgment should be reversed and remanded with com 
to appellants. 
Respectfully submitted, 
D. H. OLIVER, 
Attorney for Appellanti. 
13 8 South 2nd East, 
Salt Lake City, Utah. 1 
